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1 ll Tl'.J: ('(ll'FT OF ·n;i: UF UTAll 
U-M INVES'i'!Il:ttfS, a Utcih 
limited pHrtnership, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DALE V. RAY, ct. al., 
Defendants, 
TERRELL L. BIRD AtlD JANET 
L. BIRD, 
Appellants, 
-vs-
ROSS A RAY and PERRY RAY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 19121 
BRIEF OF RESPONDE!lTS 
nATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter was brought bc:Lore the Court on 
• <il i ,.r,, ;,ir Entry of Judgtr.eni: on a Superscdeas Bond. 
DISPOSITIOU Ill THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court denied Appellants' Hotion for 
Lntry of Judgrr:ent on the Supersedeas Bond. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
ju<lr;ment. Responder1ts seek affirmance of said order. 
STATE11ENT OF FACTS 
Ross A. Ray and Perry Ray signed a docUQent 
entitled "Supersedeas Bond" on the 22nd day of March, 1982, 
was filed in Civil No. 7563 and Supreme Court Case No. 
18216. A judgment had been entered in the above-entitled 
ciction against certain of the named Defendants. An appeal 
v.as taken to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah and the 
subject supersedeas bond was subsequently filed on Hay 21, 
1982, with the clerk of the District Court of Iron County. 
The appeal was subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah o.nd Defendants and Cross-claimants 
Terrell L. Bird and Janet L. Bird moved the District Court 
for an entry of judgment on the supersedeas bond for the 
full of the lower court's judgment together with 
interest thereon. The sureties on said bond resisted the 
L<ltry n[ said judgment. The trial court denied Appellants 
[' .. t i<>n for Judbffient on Supersedeas Bond on March 10, 1983. 
1 
,\PGllllEliT 
In Crane v. 203 ll.S. 441, 51 L f,cl f.60, 
S Ct 56, the U.S. :;uprcr,1e Court stated, ":tis ell'T;.cnt;uy 
that the obligation of sureties upon bonds is stricth,:imi 
juris and not to be .;xtendcd by implicution or enlart;ed 
construction of the terns of the contract entereu into." 
Am.Jur. 2d Appeal and Error 1029 states, "Liability under 
appeal or supersedeas bond is strictly determinable by the 
express terms of the contract of undertaking. The 
obligation is upon the undertaking, an instrument in 
writing, not upon the judgment." This same general rule is 
cited in SB C.J.S. Appeal and Error §2008. See also 2 
R.C.L. Appeal and Error §267. The law is clear that an 
undertaking on appeal is to be construed strictly according 
to its terms. As further evidence of this general rule, thE 
Court is directed to the case of \Joodle v. Settlemyer, 71 
Or. 25, 141 P.205 (1914). This case dealt with an actionb 
Claude P. Woodle against the surety on the undertaking 
entered into on the appeal from the original judgment. The 
court disraissed the action on the undert:aking on the ground: 
that the appeal was never perfected and thus no liability 
could be imposed upon the surety pursuant to the conditions 
of the bond. However the court was very succinct in its 
discussion concerning the liabilit:y which is to be imposed 
upon sureties on such undertakings. The court quoted froo 
32 CY C., page 73, as fnllows: 
Sureties are said to be favorites ot the Lrn, 01'' 
a contract of suretyship must be EtricLly 
construed to impose upon the surety only 
burdens clearly within its terms, and r.'ust r;r 1 l 
e;:tended by irnplicatiun or presur.1ptiun. lhis ' 1 
is followul both at law and in l'lJUity. Td. at 
206. 
ln 2 Brandt on Surctyship and Guarantee, (3rd 
,di1 i1>11) it states, "Surecies on an appeal bond 2re 
L·<1l111(: unly according to the terms of their contract." Id., 
,,1 ;'(}t'. In Phoeni:-: Manufacturing Co. v. Borgardus, 231 Ill. 
'di, c;:; 1;.E. 235, the ccurt said: 
1he law is well settled that the undertaking of a 
surety is to be strictly construed, and his 
liability not to be extended by construction. Id. 
at 206. 
In State of Maryland v. Dayton, 101 Md. 598, 61 A. 
624, the court states: 
As to t.he general principle applicable to a case 
of this kind there can be no question. It is 
familiar law that the contract of sureties upon an 
official bond is subject to the strictist 
interpretation. They undertake for nothing which 
is not within the strict letter of their contract. 
The obligacion is strictissimi auris and nothing 
is to be taken by construction y the obligors. 
They have consenced to be bound to a certain 
extent only, and their liability must be found 
within the terns of that consent. Id. at 206. 
Kirschbauw and Comp2ny v. Blair, 98 Vir. 35, 34 
S.E. 895 states as part of the syllabus: 
But, having ascertained what the contract is, he 
is bound by this alone. There is no implied 
liability resting on him. His liability is always 
strictissirni juris and is not to be extended by 
implicacion or construction. Id. at 206 and 207. 
Childs on Suretyship and Guarantee, at pages 124 
<:llld 125, states: 
\Jhile a surety is denominated a favorite of the 
law, there is a very limited field for the 
of this doctrine. The nature of the 
contract invokes equitable consideration, but the 
general rules for the construction of contracts 
are not thereby. This liability will not 
be extended by implication and his contract is 
strictly construed. . . . In cases of doubt the 
Joubt is solved generally in his favor. at 
207. 
3 
lT:.e ;1; tl·L' in:;t.illl (_'L:.c:l. ,·,i1-'\1('(' ,111 
undcrt:1kinr, to i1z'j _ _)u;,1 n1 i.1, 
c0rtain cvPJition::.. to lhe ubil·l. 
A. Ray and Perry Pe>)' '.oi(',ned, they iio12nd vcs clc 
folluws: 
1;01, therefore, in co11sidcr«t ion of the prl'L1i,,es 
and of such appeal, the undl'rSi[',ned, Ross /,, J:ai' 
and l'crry Ray, clocs hereby undertal;e cmd pumise, 
on the part of appellants, that suid appellnnts 
will pay all and costs which may be 
awarded against it on the <:eppeal or on a disnioSc. 
thereof, not exceeding, One Hundred Twenty-Eighl 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($128,500.00), 11it:1 
interest thereon at the rc.te of Twelve Percent 
(12%) per annum from DecerJbcr 29, 1982, to which 
arwunt the undersigned Ross A. Ray and Perry Ra)' 
acknowledges itself bound. 
Giving the above cited lancuage a stiict 
interpretation, as is required, the sureties only bound 
themselves to pay the damages and costs uhich would be 
awarded by the appellate court and th(·y did not bind 
themselves to pay the judgr;ient or any portion thereof. 'f1 
Dailey v. Sawatzky, 211 P.2d 298 (Okla., 1949) Lhe court 
stated that "the liability of a surety under a supersededc 
bond is contractual, is to be determined by the provisious 
of the bond, and the surety cannot be held liable beyond 
terms." In the above cited case, the Ok 1 ahoraa s ta Lutes 
provided certain provisions for taking an appeal to the 
Supreme Court. These provisions were provided for in 
statute. The supersedcLs bond given did not follow the 
statutory language, nor did it obligate tlie sureties uncl' 
tho precise; terE;s ol rhL :-JL 1Lulc. OL1dhOr.L1 SurJ;-,__'r.t--
Court, in detemining the C):t:ent of the surety's li;obil1i 
stated: 
It is asserted by plaintiff that the court 
evidently had in mind this section at the time the 
1 "lfld was approved, and al though the bond was not 
conditioned as provided by this section the 
sureties are nevertheless liable for damages as 
thereby provided. This contention cannot be 
of the above statute 
cannot he read into the bond. (Emphasis added) 
In the instant action, this Court is faced with a 
similar :oituation. Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
73(d), provides: 
an appellant entitled thereto desires a 
stay on appeal, he may present to the court for 
its approval a supersedeas bond which shall have 
such surety or sureties as the court requires. 
The bond shall be conditioned for the satisfaction 
of the judgment in full with costs, 
interest, and damages fur delay, if for any reason 
the appeal is dismissed or if the judgment is 
affirmed, and to satisfy in full such modification 
of i::he judgment and such costs, interest, and 
damages as the appellate court may adjudge and 
award. \.Jhen the judgment is for the recovery of 
money not otherwise secured, the amount of the 
bond shall be fixed at such sum as will cover the 
whole amount of the judgment remaining 
unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest, and 
damages for delay, unless the court after notice 
and hearing and for good cause shown fixes a 
different amount or orders security other than the 
bond. 
It is not disputed that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure require that a supersedeas bond be conditioned 
upon the payment of the entire judgment. It is disputed, 
however, that the instant bond is conditioned for the 
p;:iymL·nt of such sur!l. In the Daily v. Sawatsky case, supra., 
1 ti,, , 1\: 1 allc'C1u court i urthcr discussed the statutory 
relating to the conditions of appeal bonds. The 
111u1c slated that while it was true that the applicable 
,,,·ct i<•ns set out the conditions of such bonds, the bonds are 
110L pncsumed to contain such provisions, nor are those 
5 
'
1 Tht (·::1, 
of liability upun a h,nd is ln b,. 1>'1 herc·d ; 
the provisions of the bond." Id. ;lt t:oo. Thv (JL!ah"m" 
court further cited the c·au• of ,.t. d[ 
163 Okla. 246, 22 P.2d 1026, 103], in which the court s:,ic: 
It is the contention nf the plaintiff in this 
cause that appropriate provisions should be 
treated as appearing in the bond even rhoup,h t!ic 
are absent therefrou, un the Lbcory that the · 
statute itself should be considered as a part of 
the bond. With this contention we cannot 
agree . The sureties on a superscdeas bor,c 
will be held only in accordance with the contract 
that was executed and that the court is not 
authorized to re>Jri le the contract and thereby 
impose upon such surety liability which they did 
not assume. 
The Appellants would apparently have this Court 
interpret the instant bond as containing all the provisiuns 
outlined in U.R.Civ.P., rule 73(d). In fact the instant 
bond does not contain such language or provisions, nor does 
it even i:iention Rule 73(d). This Court is without authoriL 
to insert conditions in the bond which Appellants merely 
hope are there. 
Rule 73(d) is in accord with Rule 62(d) of the 
U.R.Civ.P. Rule 62(d) states: 
IL·,,, an ""• "'' [s t;;l'cn Lhc appelLt11t by 1ci,in1; 
superse<l<oas bond may obtain a stay, unless such -
stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these 
rules. The bond may be given at or after the tiL. 
of filing the notice of appeal. The stay is , 
effective when the supersedeas bond is approved L 
the court. 
Rule 62(.LJ c;r,;tcs: 
The adverse pc:rl y m:iy c::cl·pt to the ic J c11c 
the suretit.cs t<' the unclcrL.king fih·d 1•ur:;uCJ111 
the provi,,ions of this rule at any tir.ic wirl1"'' 
after \·;r.;..lten notice· of Lh(! [il l1!" such 
undertakings; and, llnlc'.;s thl'yui-
1,:Jithin }Q d.::ys Lli ll'l- Sl-'rViCL· oi t 11U1 lLL' 01 '.ijl 
r;;:cc·pt ion, justify before a judge of the court in 
v.'hich the judgment was entered, or the clerk 
1 hL'rc:of, upon not l(,SS than 5 days notice to the 
party excepting to such surety of the time and 
place' of just:ificatiort, execution of the judgr;ient 
ic; no longei· stayed. 
l t is apparent fror.1 re;:;ding the doculilent entitled 
":0111wrscdcets Bond", contained in the file, thal said bond 
doc's nut comply with the stc.tutory language found in Rule 
7l(d). The bond is not conditioned for the satisfaction of 
the judgraent in full together with costs, interest and 
damages for delay as required by said rule. It should be 
noted howc:ver that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure give 
the respondent ample opportunity to take exception to the 
of that bond. By taking such an exception, the 
respondent in the appeal can insure that the supersedeas 
bond filed is sufficient and adequate under Rule 73(d). The 
Respondents in the instant action did not file such an 
excccption. They merely assumed that the bond was adequate 
to cover the entire judgment. This assuraption was ill 
founded and cannot now be relied upon by the Respondents to 
hold the sureties liable for sums they did not obligate 
themselves to pay. 
It is clear that the sureties in the instant 
1cc_ion did not undertake to pay the judgment rendered by the 
District Court. As it was stated in the Woodle v. 
Settlemyer case, "It is the province of courts to construe 
contracts, but not to make them for parties." Woodle, 
sup!a__,_ at 207. 
The Rays' as sureties on the 
edcas bond in the instant action is limited by the 
i llf their undertaking. Their obligation extends only 
to c\c;r;iages and costs which were awarded against it on 
llH· , f'peal or a disr.1issal thereof. The appeal to the 
7 
Supreme Court of Utch VliJS ci '.Pli ,,SC'd by thL c('LHl. Tl1c 
SuprL'mc Coc:rt did nut a11:n-d ::ny aJdi tirnkl cL:u"1/;c·'.; 
result of the appc,;,l 11L1r dicl tlic::/ ilw:ird ;111y cc>:;\;; un th, 
appe;i). Thus the Roys hcivc: 11''> l i;,\Ji li Ly rn>cier the 
supersedcas bor<d by then. To iGJpusc: 1L1bility ,,,, 
the Rays under the superscdeiis bunci :Cor the total <.L1ount 0 , 
the judgment \rnuld require this Court to rewrite the 
contract by the Rays and provide for an additional 
condition for payment of said judgment. This Court is 
without authority to make such a reformation. 
rornT 11: TEE CO!JDITIO!l TO PAY ALL DAllAGES AHD 
COSTS DOES !WT INCLUDE TllE OELIGATlO!i 
PAY TllE UUDERL'ill;G JUDGHEUT 
During the oral argument on this motion, the Tr;, 
Court advanced the proposition that a supersedeas bond 
conditioned to pay all damages awarded on the appeal or a 
dismissal thereof included the amount of the lower court's 
judgment. Such proposit:ion is not supported in the law one 
is contrary to the strict interpretation given to such booo 
as outlined in Point I of this argument. Support for the 
argument that such an appeal bond does not extend to 
of the original judgment is found in Omaha Hotel Co. v. 
Kountze, 107 U.S. 609. In this case the U.S. Supreme Coun 
analyzed the 1 iability imposed upon a surety by giving an 
undert:aking on appeal. In that analysis the court definec 
the ten:n "all damages and costs", by saying that 
According t:o the English law, the terms "all 
damnges ancl costs," wciuld 011\y cOVl'C the danJges 
[or deolay, '.;c·curity for Lhe original judgmenr 
being expressly provided for by separate word• 
Id. at 612. 
I, quc,;tiun arose in that case as to what damages were to 
I' .. L;.nh·d Juc to the breach of the appeal bond. The court 
,,, I [1,; uJ: hrcd those cases wherein the statute raade specific 
l'' "vis inn for coverage of the original judgment and those 
wherein the bond is to be conditioned generally for 
"11 tlcn:ic;e.s .:::nd costs. In the instant action our Utah Rules 
uf Civil Procedure specifically provide for a supersedeas 
bond to include the stateTJent that it is conditioned upon 
the satisfaction of the judgment, in order to be effective 
as a supersedeas bond. The bond signed by Ross A. Ray and 
Perry Ray is not so conditioned. 2 R.C.L. Appeal and Error 
§:!70 st;:.tes: 
A condition frequently encountered in appeal bonds 
is one providing for the payment of all damages 
resulting from the appeal. Such a provision 
includes only such damages as are the natural and 
proximate result, and does not necessarily require 
the payment of the judgment recovered. 
There are cases which have interpreted an appeal 
of supersedeas bond conditioned upon the payment of costs 
and danages to include the payment of the underlying 
judgment. Hm.1ever these cases can be distinguished from the 
case at bar. Several of these cases can be found at 124 
A.L.R. 497. The annotated case gives the main 
distinguishing feature in those decisions which have 
interpreted an appeal bond to include the condition of 
payr,1ent of the judgnent. In Hartin v. Clarke, 105 Fed. 2d 
684, the court interpreted the bond which was conditioned 
upon payment of all damages and costs that oay be awarded to 
inclurL the underlying j"dgucnt. However in that case, the 
r·11rirt ntllcd that the bond was read in light of the law, the 
µ ,·c, cc1u1 ,, ::ind the order 1.1hich directed the bond to be made. 
'! l1r· J mJcl" court had entered an order granting the appeal 
pursu,Jl•l" to a Federal statute. The order allm1ing the 
9 
appe0l set the bol!C.:l at cl ::u1c; rc·rt.; Lt\ c11Hl uncdi l ic>ncJ i l 
required by Liw tll C>peratc 0s 
The Jistin[',ui_sbing fccdure 01 that cccS<' is that Lhc: lncJet 
court entered its ordc:r e'ctting ciu ;__ l he· co;;Ji l i ems of 11,, 
bond pursuant to the statutv. The court held Lh0t c:vcn 
though the bond did nut concain <iny languztt;eo reociLing th" 
the bond was conditioned upon the payment of the lower 
court's judgment, the court's order oade such 10nt:;uaf.e 
applicable. The above-referenced annotation cites several 
cases in which the court made a similar decision in 
to imposing liability upon the surety fur the amount of th 
judgoent. In each of those cases the court found that the 
bond was to be construed in lit!,ht of the lower court's ord« 
granting the appeal. 
In the instant action, the lower court did not 
issue an order allowing the appeal or setting the terms cl 
the bond. The above-cited annotation states: 
The weight of authority seeos to be to the effect 
that a bond which is not in terns conditioned for 
the payment or satisfaction of the judgment but 
for the payment of dar.<ages and costs cannot by 
construction be given that effect . . even 
though a statute required that a bond given on 
appeal be conditioned that the appellant, if 
unsuccessful, should pay and satisfy the 
which shoulrl be rendered by the appellate courl. 
LJ. at 50, 
ln Brace :Oquire, 2 D Chip ( VL.) 49 (1824), hel 
that, under a bond given on appeal, conditioned that the 
plaintiff answer all damages and costs, the obligation of 
the surety did 1101 e the pcyTtt'Tl 1 of t1r1e 2Utoun1 '->i t\',t 
original judgment. The unc!ertakinf', to answer a 11 J;mage> 
and costs I'lerely a10c•Hntcd le' an unJertakit•L, to pay all th· 
actual daUJages uhich the c1"fe11Jaut should sustain in 
consequence of the 2ppcal, and the coHL legally taxable. 
124 A.L.R. 497 at The ;.huvc an11utoti()n al:Jo .st<Jtes: 
1 0 
• 
Su, although a statute at the time a bond to take 
a writ of error was given provided that the person 
applyinG writ of error should execute a bond 
with sufficient security to be approved by the 
court, conditioned for prosecuting the writ of 
error to effect, and to pay and satisfy the 
judgment which should be rendered in the cause by 
the Su;:ireme Court, the bond actually given being 
conditioned that if the appellant should well and 
truly prosecute to affect his writ of error to the 
Supnemc Court of Errors and Appeals, and if he 
should pay all costs and damages that might be 
adjudged or awarded against him by said court, 
then such bond should be null and void, the court 
in La Tourette v. Baird, (1824) minor (ALA) 325, 
held that the surety on the bond might not be held 
liable for the original debt or principal judgment 
of the trial court. Id. at 505 and 506. 
The same result was reached in Fidelity and C 
Conµany v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 615, 34 P.2d 736 
(1934). The statute provided that a written undertaking be 
executed in double the amount named in the judgment and was 
to be conditioned upon the appellant paying the amount of 
Lhe judgment and the damages and costs which might be 
awarded against him on the appeal in the event the appeal 
1/as affiri;1ed. The bond actually given was conditioned that 
the appellant would pay all damage and cost which might be 
awarded on appeal, or dismissal thereof. It was held that 
::; 1 UL' 1 1 '-' 1•g uc itL,_·r ':int.JJned d provision 
th;it the surety would be bound "in double the amount named 
in the judgment or a provision that the surety will "pay the 
aP1ount directed to be paid by the judgment" as affirned, it 
did not cover the payment of the amount of the judgment. 
1:1, ,\.L.R. 497 at SC6. ln adhering to the same rule in 
\:ickle and !''Allister v. H'Combs, 2 YERG (Tenn.) 83 (1822), 
: Ii" '«Url pointed out that nothing could be added to the 
'«11diLiu11 c1f the bond as given, for "otherwise Lian would be 
l·uu1\l:, iwt by the contracts they had entered into, but by 
11 
wh.Jt thL' court miE,lir pre;,lJrilL' t h(_'J' 1111 c1u\1._ 1 ll l nt t· 1- ii:Lci .. , 
Jn SJ ui th(' .Jhu\'e-citcd l,1l]()1t, tlit lt ;11·l. (JL[ 
stat:t cuu1-t llcci,;iunc: rc'ciLi111; thi:, :,,11·k \,"' ic princ·ipci 
The prc1'1ise being that to bulu " sur1·t y 1 i;,lJle iur rl:c 
µayr.1rc11t: of t:bc origirwl _iudp.icnl \>'uuJ d he to holci bi 11 b'/· 
the tcnCJs o[ his bond, \:hich carnwc Le dune. 
The bond sigr1ul by Roc.s <'1Hl Perry Ray is 
conditionrcd upon the payucnt of all d.st«a0es and custs. 
Although the Utah Rules of Civil Prucrcdure state that a 
supersedeas bond must be conditioned upon the pc;yr,1ent oi 
underlying judgment, the Rays did not undertake to provi<lt 
such security. The respondents in that action had amph 
opportunity, pursuant lo the Utah l:lules of Civil Procedure, 
to require additional security. The;ir rrcasons for not doir. 
so cannot be argued before this Court at this late date in 
an atter.ipt to £xpand the terms of the original bond and to 
impose liability upon the Rays, which liability they did 
e::pressly undertake. The bond signed by the P,ays is not 
conditioned upon the payment of the ur.derlying judgment or.: 
the Birds are not entitled to a judgment against the 
sureties for the amount of said judgment. 
POINT III: A SUPERSED[f,S BotlD IS llOT EFFECTIVE 
UllTIL APPP,OVEll DY '1"iiE COURT 
Rule 62(d) of the Utah Ru1es of Civil Procedure 
states that a supersedeas bond and the resulting stay is 
ef feet ive unti 1 the bo-,1d is approved by the court. In tlce 
instant action no such approval ever given, nor Jid 
LUUrt CVtJl il., Ul(J, 1 :)Ldy 1 C'/.L'CUt il)ll u1 thl! jud)'', 
pursuant to the postin/c tlie supe:c;L·d<,;1s. The jucl['.flc't'I 
appealed from was nnt c:cn1 it led t '' ;: st Py of cxecutiun u 
such tinc as the Coc:rt h::d ;ippn'\'<·<i tltc' lwr 11 
I;> 
i l<" L, Lhe Appell;;nts. The bond in this matter was filed 
,.,,11· tic: clcrl: Gf the court on May 21, 1982, and was sent to 
t!" c1"1s' attorney. Th<e Birds' attorney did not take any 
"L, i "''' 1.hc:t soever in rc:g<ords to the a-mount of the bond, or 
th» "'''"jj tions of the bond or see if the bond was effective 
,; He should not, at this time, be allowed 
tu 1;cek j udgmertt 2gainst the sureties on a bond that never 
hecar.:" <:iiective. 
POINT IV: REBUTTAL TO APPEALLANTS' AUTHORITIES 
This point is given as a brief reubttal to several 
of the authorities cited by the Appellants in their appeal 
brief. Aviation Credit Corporation v. Connor Airlines, 
111c., 307 F.2cl 685 (5th Cir. 1962), dealt with how interim 
proceeds from the subject property were to be distributed 
where the supersedeas bond did not cover the entire 
mortgaged debt. Such a situation does not exist in the 
instant case. It is further stated that the real intent of 
the sureties in the instant case can be determined from the 
:act of the supersedeas bond itself. 
Beehive 11edical Electronics, Inc. v. Industrial 
583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978); Quagliana v. Exquisite 
Hotie Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975), deal with the 
idea thaL a contract impliedly contain.s laws of the state 
,•xisting at the time: THE Beehive case deals with the 
o.nti-ciiscrir.iination and the impairment of obligations under 
co11trc<cts provisions of the Utah Constitution and the Quagliana 
case clCciilS with the zoning requirements of a city. These 
01e drastically different than the case at bar and 
l:<i\c "" :1pplication to the bond filed by the Respondents. 
The Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976) case 
1101 rlini; fur the proposition that contracts are to be 
13 
in the r,:; CJ!l'l- t:l) ci fcct, 1:!t (' Vdlicl ( ,1111-1-<11 tu; 1] 
rc]ations, jt ::::tolled r-he hnnd in qut:ti()1L i11 
inst2rt c2se is a Vol.id c()ntrnctu;1} obliL,L"Li(1Jl of lhe 
3nd tbat th,, LJt1gua1:;c contiliner\ in the bur:d 
itscl:L can be construed in clear :ind urir1islakable ten.rs, 
which ten-is (Lo pay all daoages costs which may be 
awarded on the appeal) represent the purpose for v>bich rhe 
bond was executed. 
It is agreed that the policy of the law in Utah : 
to look with disfavor upon semi-concealed or obscure self-
protecting provisions in a document as stated in the 
Christopher v. Larsen Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d lGOQ 
1976) case. This case, however, is inapplicable in the 
instant &ction as the bond suboitted by the io 
in clear and unequovical teru<S and contains no 
semi-concealed or obscure provisions. The 
cases of Wagstaff v. Rernco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (Utah 1975): 
and \Jells Fargo Bank v. l\idwE:st Realty and Finance Collipany, 
554 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975), are likewise inRpplicable to the 
instant action as the bond which is the subject of this 
action does not contain any uncectainties or ambiguities 
which need be resolved by this Court. 
COUCLUSIOI< 
It is the well accepted and general rule that 
appeal or supersedeas bonds are to be strictly construed 
according to the terms of the bond itself. The Court 
in a positiun to imp1',· :i ('onstr11cti"n "f said hond thac io 
not expressly prov;_ded tlterein. tlor does thee Court have 
authority to impose l iabj l i ty upon the sur<'l ies of the bi''' 
consistent with the provisions of a stat<' >;tatute, uulcc, 
those statutory provisions were cxprc;;sly m:1de a pi.let ul 
bend. Our Utah rules provide thnt :i ,-upcn,L'dl"dS bowl is 
I" n·nditioncd upon satis£action of the judgment in full 
1 "!.' t lier with costs, interest and damages for delay or for 
any L1ocli[ication of the jud[';Dent and such costs, interest 
;•nd daIDages as the appell&te court may adjudge and award. 
These conditions are separate and distinct items and they 
;:iay not be lumped together into une item or tern. Damages 
are not cost, interest or the judgment, nor does the 
judgment constitute damages, interest or costs. The pure 
and simple reading of the supersedeas bond posted in this 
matter makes it apparent that it is 
payi;1cnt of the underlying judgment. 
should be dismissed. 
not conditioned upon the 
The Appellants' appeal 
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